Clone & install
git clone https://github.com/Gareth1953/agent-trust-gate.git
cd agent-trust-gate
npm ci
cd agent-trust-gate
npm ci
Reviewer evidence centre
Don’t trust the pitch. Inspect the proof.
The ATG public repository is designed to let technical reviewers see what is implemented, what refuses, what remains synthetic and where the production boundary sits.
Start here
A compact reviewer path.
The shortest technical route is deliberately simple. From a fresh clone, install dependencies and run the compact reviewer sequence. It exits non-zero if a required invariant fails.
Run reviewer
npm run reviewer
Runs the compact fixed-fixture reviewer sequence and outcome-derived scorecard.
Go deeper
npm run demo:reviewer-kit
npm run demo:reviewer-kit -- --summary-only
npm run demo:reviewer-kit -- --json
npm run demo:reviewer-kit -- --summary-only
npm run demo:reviewer-kit -- --json
Working public demonstrations
See the trust layers behave.
These are deterministic local demonstrations using fictional identities, permissions and transactions. They are built to show both successful and refused outcomes.
Can this requester even ask?
Inspect identity-control evidence, accountable principal, delegation, limits, expiry, revocation, counterparty and standing handoff into GatePass evaluation.
Open Agent Standing demo →Did an authorised human approve this exact action?
Inspect active identity, authority limits, self-approval restrictions, second approver policy, changed action, expiry, replay and dual-human approval.
Open Human Authority demo →How do the layers connect?
Review Agent Standing, mandate, evidence, Verified Human Authority, GatePass, refusal and execution-receipt relationships.
Open control model →Evidence catalogue
Technical artefacts behind the corporate site.
ATG keeps the commercial story attached to inspectable technical material. The evidence below is public and intended to support challenge rather than prevent it.
Exact-action schemas
GatePass and execution-receipt schemas define machine-readable proof structures.
Browse schemas →Threat-model material
Round-trip threat modelling and reviewer limitations document failure boundaries and assumptions.
Read threat model →OWASP mapping
Public mapping to the OWASP Agentic Top 10 provides control-oriented reviewer context without claiming certification.
Open mapping →NIST reference map
Identity and authorisation reference material connects the demonstrator to relevant NIST concepts.
Open NIST map →Paid pilot boundary
The commercial route is published alongside explicit constraints on scope, access and production claims.
Review pilot boundary →Project history
The mission register preserves development history and helps reviewers understand how the architecture evolved.
Open mission register →Refusal is evidence too
A safe demo should prove that it can say no.
ATG treats expected refusal scenarios as successful test outcomes only when the observed result actually refuses the unsafe action. The demonstrator includes changed-action, expiry, replay, exceeded-authority and other negative paths because a trust gate that only demonstrates approval is not much of a gate.
- Changed amount or other bound action detail
- Expired or replayed proof
- Inactive or unauthorised human approver
- Exceeded authority limit
- Prohibited self-approval
- Missing required second approver
- Revoked, unknown or insufficient requester standing
Reviewer principle
Expected refusals count as success only when the system actually refuses.
That sounds obvious. In AI demonstrations it is worth making explicit.
Claims boundary
What this evidence does not prove.
A professional technical site should be as clear about absences as capabilities. ATG currently makes no claim of production readiness, adoption or certification.
No live production execution
No real external tool, payment, settlement, checkout, live agent interception or autonomous financial action is executed.
No customer or regulated data
The public demonstrations use fictional/synthetic material and no production credentials or private enterprise datasets.
No security or compliance certification
Public evidence is review material, not a legal, security, regulatory, procurement or safety assurance certificate.