Evaluation security

Security with clear boundaries.

Inspectable controls, explicit limitations and an agreed process before any client information is introduced.

What you can evaluate

Control and evidence.

The published local.5 plugin demonstrates signed exact-action and business-state binding, replay controls, optional shared approval and budget controls across processes on one machine, and separately signed synthetic destination evidence.

The destination rechecks approved state before a synthetic commit. Ambiguous outcomes retain UNKNOWN holds and require explicit reconciliation rather than automatic retry. A standalone public-key verifier can inspect destination evidence without writable ATG state or destination private-key access.

Inspect the plugin and reproduction guides →

Current limits

Synthetic. Same host. No production claim.

Human and operator authority, approval signing keys and clocks remain fixtures. The separate destination key remains on the same host. This does not provide independent external capture, protection against a host administrator, a live ERP integration or production payment security.

Local evaluation records are not encrypted by ATG. OS permissions and deployment isolation remain the evaluator’s responsibility. Do not expose local demo endpoints to the internet.

No security certification or independent penetration test is claimed.Repository tests establish specific synthetic behaviours, not comprehensive security assurance.

Client information

Start with fictional records.

The public website has no customer-data upload, hosted agent execution API or customer-account system.

Minimise the data

Initial evaluations use synthetic business records. Do not send customer records, personal information, production logs, source secrets, payment details or live credentials by email.

Agree the boundary

Any proposed client-data work needs a separately agreed data flow, permitted processors, access controls, key custody, retention and deletion responsibilities.

Review before deployment

A real deployment needs its own threat assessment, authenticated roles, partner enforcement, incident and recovery procedures, and independent security assessment appropriate to the scope.

Responsible reporting

Report a concern privately.

Email gpmiddleton71@gmail.com with a minimal redacted description, affected version and safe local reproduction. Ordinary email is not a secure secret-transfer channel. Agree a suitable handling route before sharing sensitive evidence.

Please do not post secrets or sensitive exploit details in public issues. Test only local synthetic systems you own or are explicitly authorised to assess. No fixed response or remediation time is promised.

Source review and release status

Maintainer security review is distinct from independent assurance. Source changes and downloadable packages can have different review and release dates. Check the exact version and checksum you evaluate; a source fix does not automatically update a published archive.

Read the repository security policy and website privacy information.

The published local.5 download does not include the Mission 04 fixes for legacy signed JSON fields and POSIX state-file permissions. The local.7 evaluation release includes those reviewed fixes and the durable-write cleanup/error-diagnostic repair, with unchanged evaluation limits. POSIX runtime verification was not performed for this candidate; its POSIX permission test was skipped on Windows. It does not configure private Windows NTFS permissions. New and replacement files inherit their parent’s DACL, which must be separately provisioned and checked. No existing held state is repaired or migrated.

The original Windows incident remains unattributed. A matching EPERM atomic-replacement mechanism was reproduced with an owned open file handle; the original OS error and locking process are unknown. A separate cleanup defect was fixed: colliding temporary files are preserved and native errors remain available in Error.cause. Denied writes still fail closed and preserve reservations. No automatic retry or permission weakening was added; passing reruns do not clear the incident.

The unpublished local.6 archive is retained unchanged; it includes the signing/POSIX fixes but lacks the durable-write repair.

The published plugin remains an evaluation demonstrator. No production version is supported.